问题
If you were to hash a user's password prior to sending it across the line and leaving it in plain-text in memory, would this improve the security of the application?
I would assume this mitigates a small fraction of vulnerabilities by protecting the data stored in the clients memory. But really if we're worried about someone reading the client's memory there are probably bigger problems that we can't address.
There's something that doesn't feel right about hashing on the client's end.
Is password hashing on the client end a common practice? Are there any other advantages or disadvantages to doing it?
EDIT: Given the communication channel is secure (SSL). Under what conditions would it be acceptable and worthwhile to use such an approach. I'm asking this because it was suggested by a "security professional" that I use such a scheme during some application functions.
回答1:
No.
When the client sends something, whether it is P or H(P) or H(H(P)) anyone who intercepts this can simply resend the exact same thing, thus making any function like this equivalent to using the password directly.
That's why you should use a nonce; The server can give out some random garbage k and the client will calculate H(P,k) and send it to the server. HMAC is a popular implementation of this method.
Provided the server never accepts the same nonce twice, this is secure against a replay attack.
回答2:
The hash is identical to the password from a security POV in the scenario you describe: if I intercept the hash, I don't need to know the password, I can just send the server the hash I intercepted.
Authentication protocols go to some length to avoid this problem; security is hard, and you are best off selecting and implementing a well-understood protocol rather than rolling your own.
If your traffic is going over SSL, you're safe from interception and hashing gives you little extra benefit.
回答3:
Sending a hashed password won't improve security on your site, as others have pointed out (since you accept a hashed password, all the bad guy needs to know is the hashed version). It's also not really secure, since the bad guy can presumably load your login page and examine the Javascript or Java deployed.
What it does do is prevents somebody watching the packets from being able to pull out a password, and that is moderately useful. Many people use the same password on multiple sites (I do it for all but the higher security sites), and therefore if you can get one password from them you can log into other accounts on other sites.
It also prevents the real password from being stored, even temporarily, on your site, and that may provide a little extra security if your site is compromised.
So, while I'd consider user-side hashing to be potentially a good things, it isn't worth going to much extra trouble.
And, as others have told you, don't roll your own security. There's far too many things that can go wrong. You won't notice them nearly as fast as a practiced bad guy will.
回答4:
Yes, you should.
IEEE had a data breach in which 100K emails and passwords were exposed from a weblog.
http://ieeelog.com/
Obviously, IEEE should not have exposed their weblog! But if they had hashed the passwords at the client side, this wouldn't have been nearly as bad.
As the first answer states, you should use a nonce. If you use a long enough nonce (e.g. 128 bits), you don't really need to worry about reuse, as the server will never ask for the same nonce twice (assuming correctly seeded CRNG, etc.).
回答5:
No, hashing at the client does not protect the password 'completely'. When one opts to hash the password at the client, then the digest submitted to the server, essentially becomes the password. This is not a problem in itself if SSL is deployed.
However, this scheme ends up creating more problems than it solves. If the server were to compare the hash submitted by the client with a stored hash in the database without performing any further cryptographic operations (especially hashing the input data), then the password is stored in clear text for all practical purposes. Any person with access to the stored hash can re-submit it to the server and gain access to accounts.
In simple terms, if the submitted hash (which is the same as the submitted hash) were to leak via any other vulnerability within the application (via SQL injection, for instance) then the application has a vulnerability where in it protects the passwords inadequately.
If the underlying vulnerability must be fixed, then it is necessary to treat the submitted hash as a password in clear text, which should then be hashed (with a salt preferably) before comparison with a stored hash.
回答6:
Just make sure that you are sending your password through a secure channel (SSL). If the client can have an application private memory read, then most likely they have bigger problems, like for example a keylogger.
回答7:
I think it makes sense in one circumstance; you don't want to even know the client's plaintext password. If you hash at the client side, then salt and iteratively hash that hash the same way you would a plaintext pw. Other than that, its kinda silly.
回答8:
You'd be much better off if you used the Secure Remote Password protocol (SRP). It was designed for this.
回答9:
I can give you different kind of approach If you have not SSL you can hash password on client side and again it hashed on server side using another hashing method and store them on database and when user login with password do the same process and match double hashed password with stored hashes
回答10:
Hashing on the client side opens up another huge hole: you may expose the hashing algorithm. You don't say whether this is web-based (client=JavaScript) or thick-client, but you're giving them more information. Given the channel is secure, you don't have to worry about the clear text password being sniffed.
Besides, if your hashing algorithm requires a salt, you would be exposing your salt, which means if they ever got access to the database, they would be able to decrypt every password.
来源：https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1380168/does-it-make-security-sense-to-hash-password-on-client-end