safety-critical

Cppcheck allows you to create your own rules files, but I don't know how much of cppcheck's functionality is exposed. Is anyone working on a set that would enforce JSF or MISRA rules? johnwait You won't be able to implement all MISRA/JSF rules and directives as cppcheck rules, mostly only the straightforward ones restricting certain C language features and constructions or that are style-related (some that come to mind: spaces before/after ./->, # of arguments on a single line, use of unions to provide different methods of accessing memory, presence of unsigned/signed before char, etc). User

I have implemented a complex state machine with numerous state transitions for a safety SIL 4 system. The back bone for this implementation was done using function pointers. When all was sailing smoothly, the V&V opposed the use of function pointers in a SIL 4 system. Reference- Rule 9 NASA .Misra C 2004 however doesnt say that function pointers cant be used. Is there any other way to implement complex state machines without any function pointers? First of all, that NASA document is not canon. Start by asking which law/directive/standard/requirement/document that enforces you to follow the

I'm researching the development of safety-critical software, and in particular what effects the choice of programming language has on such development. Please explain, in detail, which languages are commonly used, and why. ConcernedOfTunbridgeWells Ada and SPARK (which is an Ada dialect with some hooks for static verification) are used in aerospace circles for building high reliability software such as avionics systems. There is something of an ecosystem of code verification tooling for these languages , although this technology also exists for more mainstream languages as well . Erlang was