问题
If you use a GUID as a password for a publicly facing application as a means to gain access to a service, is this security through obscurity?
I think the obvious answer is yes, but the level of security seems very high to me since the chances of guessing a GUID is very very low correct?
Update
The GUID will be stored in a device, when plugged in, will send over the GUID via SSL connection.
Maybe I could generate a GUID, then do a AES 128 bit encrption on the GUID and store that value on the device?
回答1:
In my opinion, the answer is no.
If you set a password to be a newly created GUID, then it is a rather safe password: more than 8 charcters, contains numbers, letters ans special characters, etc.
Of course, in a GUID the position of '{', '}' and '-' are known, as well as the fact that all letters are in uppercase. So as long as nobody knows that you use a GUID, the password is harder to crack. Once the attacker knows that he is seeking a GUID, the effort needed for a brute force attack reduces. From that point of view, it is security by obscurity.
Still, consider this GUID: {91626979-FB5C-439A-BBA3-7715ED647504} If you assume the attacker knows the position of the special characters, his problem is reduced to finding the string 91626979FB5C439ABBA37715ED647504. Brute forcing a 32 characters password? It will only happen in your lifetime, if someone invents a working quantum computer.
This is security by using a very, very long password, not by obscurity.
EDIT: After reading the answer of Denis Hennessy, I have to revise answer. If the GUID really contains this info (specifically the mac address) in a decryptable form, an attacker can reduce the keyspace considerably. In that case it would definitely be security by obscurity, read: rather insecure.
And of course MusiGenesis is right: there are lots of tools that generate (pseudo) random passwords. My recommendation is to stick with one of those.
回答2:
Actually, using a GUID as a password is not a good idea (compared to coming up with a truly random password of equivalent length). Although it appears long, it's actually only 16 bytes which typically includes the user's MAC address, the date/time and a smallish random element. If a hacker can determine the users MAC address, it's relatively straightforward to guess possible GUID's that he would generate.
回答3:
If one can observe the GUID being sent (e.g. via HTTP Auth), then it's irrelevant how guessable it is.
Some sites, like Flickr, employ an API key and a secret key. The secret key is used to create a signature via MD5 hash. The server calculates the same signature using the secret key and does auth that way. The secret never needs to go over the network.
回答4:
GUID is to prevent accidental collisions, not intentional ones. In other words, you are unlikely to guess a GUID, but it is not necessarily hard to find out if you really want to.
回答5:
At first I was ready to give an unqualified yes, but it got me thinking about whether that meant that ALL password based authentication is security by obscurity. In the strictest sense I suppose it is, in a way.
However, assuming you have users logging in with passwords and you aren't posting that GUID anywhere, I think the risks are outweighed by the less secure passwords the users have, or even the sysadmin password.
If you had said the URL to an admin page that wasn't otherwise protected included a hard coded GUID, then the answer would be a definite yes.
回答6:
I agree with most other people that it is better than a weak password but it would be preferable to use something stronger like a certificate exchange that is meant for this sort of authentication (if the device supports it).
I would also ensure that you do some sort of mutual authentication (i.e. have the device verify the servers SSL certificate to ensure it is the one you expect). It would be easy enough of me to grab the device, plug it into my system, and read the GUID off of it then replay that back to the target system.
回答7:
In general, you introduce security vulnerabilities if you embed the key in your device, or if you transmit the key during authentication. It doesn't matter whether they key is a GUID or a password, as the only cryptographic difference is in their length and randomness. In either case, an attacker can either scan your product's memory or eavesdrop on the authentication process.
You can mitigate this in several ways, each of which ultimately boils down to increasing the obscurity (or level of protection) of the key:
Encrypt the key before you store it. Of course, now you need to store that encryption key, but you've introduced a level of indirection.
Calculate the key, rather than storing it. Now an attacker must reverse-engineer your algorithm, rather than simply searching for a key.
Transmit a hash of the key during authentication, rather than the key itself, as others have suggested, or use challenge-response authentication. Both of these methods prevent the key from being transmitted in plaintext. SSL will also accomplish this, but then you're depending on the user to maintain a proper implementation; you've lost control over the security.
As always, whenever you're addressing security, you need to consider various tradeoffs. What is the likelihood of an attack? What is the risk if an attack is successful? What is the cost of security in terms of development, support, and usability?
A good solution is usually a compromise that addresses each of these factors satisfactorily. Good luck!
回答8:
It's better than using "password" as the password, at least.
I don't think a GUID would be considered a strong password, and there are lots of strong password generators out there that you could use just as easily as Guid.NewGuid().
回答9:
It really depends on what you want to do. Using a GUID as password is not in itself security through obscurity (but beware the fact that a GUID contains many guessable bits out of the 128 total: there is a timestamp, some include the MAC address of the machine that generated it, etc.) but the real problem is how you will store and communicate that password to the server.
If the password is stored on a server-side script that is never shown to the end user, there is not much risk. If the password is embedded in some application that the user downloads to its own machine, then you will have to obfuscate the password in the application, and there is no way to do that securely. By running a debugger, a user will always be able to access the password.
回答10:
Sure it is security by obscurity. But is this bad? Any "strong" password is security by obscurity. You count on the authentication system to be secure, but in the end if your password is easy to guess then it doesn't matter how good the authentication system is. So you make a "strong" and "obscure" password to make it hard to guess.
回答11:
It's only security through obscurity to the extent that that's what passwords are. Probably the primary problem with using a GUID as a password is that only letters and numbers are used. However, a GUID is pretty long compared to most passwords. No password is secure to an exhaustive search; that's pretty obvious. Simply because a GUID may or may not have some basis on some sort of timestamp or perhaps a MAC address is somewhat irrelevant.
The difference in probability of guessing it and something else is pretty minimal. Some GUIDs might be "easier" (read: quicker) to break then others. Longer is better. However, more diversity in the alphabet is also better. But again, exhaustive search reveals all.
回答12:
I recommend against using a GUID as a password (except maybe as an initial one to be changed later). Any password that has to be written down to be remembered is inherently unsafe. It will get written down.
Edit: "inherently" is inaccurate. see conversation in comments
来源：https://stackoverflow.com/questions/290405/is-using-a-guid-security-though-obscurity